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Taxation of the 
Insurance Industry
Martin F. Grace and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
IN SUR AN C E TAXATION
In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter examines the insurance industry, its contribution to the 
Ohio economy, and issues in the taxation of the Ohio insurance industry. 
Insurance is a very im portant service provided in the economy, and because 
of its special nature it is often taxed differently than other types of corpora­
tions and even o ther financial service firms.
Table 12-1 com pares the insurance industry with others in the state and 
shows that the insurance industry pays m ore in premium and capital and sur­
plus taxes than the banking industry pays in net worth taxes. The insurance 
tax accounts for approximately 26 percent of corporate franchise taxes (in ­
cluded insurance taxes, corporate net income and net worth tax, and finan­
cial institutions taxes). In comparison, the m anufacturing sector pays 
approximately the same am ount as the insurance industry, while the service 
sector pays about 5.5 percent of business taxes. The insurance industry em ­
ploys slightly m ore people than the banking sector, while contributing about 
the same am ount to state GDP. Thus, the insurance industry is an im portant 
part of O hio’s tax structure as well as the sta te’s economy.
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TABLE 12-1 
Relative Im portance of Insurance Industry 
Relative to O ther Industries in Ohio
Industry
Total Taxes 
paid 
to  Dept. Of 
Taxation (1992) 
(Million S)
Percent of 
Total 
Corporation  
Taxes Paid 
(1992)*
Total Number 
of Employees Average Wage
Percent of Ohio 
GDP 
(1989)
Insurance* 277.1 25.80 90,300 S32.064 1.73
Banking' 157.9 15.56 87,200 $24,900 1.86
Services 60.2 5.6 1,490,700 $21,770 1696
Manufacturing 282.6 26.31 1,278.500 $33,943 27.53
Corporations 630.1 58.65 - — —
Sources: Ohio Bureau o f Employment Services. U.S. Dept of Labor. Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Employment and 
Earnings (1993); Ohio Department o f Taxation, and U.S . Dept of Commerce. Survey o f Current Business
'Includes all corporation net income and net worth taxes, financial institution taxes, and insurance premium taxes.
•Premium Taxes only 
f in an c ia l Institution Taxes Only
P e r f o r m a n c e  o f  O h i o ’s I n s u r a n c e  I n d u s t r y
In 1993 the state o f O hio was hom e to 47 life insurance companies and 
165 property-liability companies. This num ber has changed dramatically 
over time. O ver the last 30 years a num ber of com panies have domesticated 
in Ohio. The increase in the num ber of property and liability companies oc­
curred  after 1979, while the life industry experienced growth until the mid­
dle 1970s and then stabilized.1 The home office of an insurance company 
contains m ost o f the com pany’s employment base as well as its operations 
base. Thus, obtaining and retaining home offices would increase employ­
m ent and econom ic developm ent in O hio.2 W heaton (1986) found that 
sta tes’ tax policy can penalize the domestic industry in term s of future 
growth of the industry. Thus, it is im portant to make sure that there is a full 
understanding of the effects of all income tax policies and how they interact 
to  effect em ploym ent and growth of the sta te’s insurance industry.
I n d u s t r y  B r e a k d o w n
Property and Liability. The O hio property and liability insurance industry 
is m ade up o f approxim ately 800 companies selling insurance for auto, 
hom eow ner, com m ercial, liability, and other coverages. In 1992 approxi­
m ately 50,000 people were employed in the property-liability insurance in­
dustry in Ohio. O f these, 165 were dom estic companies, accounting for 5 
percent of prem ium s written in 1992.
Life. The life insurance industry includes 695 companies writing group and 
individual life insurance. These firms employ approximately 20,000 people in
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Ohio. Life insurance is actually two products: one for savings, and one for 
indemnity in case of death. Since there is a savings com ponent, it is very im­
portant that tax policy be structured to be consistent with other savings 
products. To the extent there is different tax treatm ent between the savings 
component of a life insurance product and the savings com ponent of some 
other financial contract, the sta te’s tax policy could bias or reduce the 
amount of savings within the state. O f the approximately 695 companies 
writing business in Ohio, 47 are domestic companies. These companies ac­
count for 13 percent o f the life business written in Ohio.
Other. In addition to  accident and health insurance w ritten by life insur­
ance companies o r by traditional property-liability companies, there are a 
number of o ther providers of health coverage. There are Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield providers in O hio.3 These companies are now classified as domestic 
mutual property-liability companies. In 1991 they accounted for $1,885 bil­
lion in subscriber prem ium s, representing 21 percent of the non-life prem i­
ums (excluding H M O s) in Ohio. In addition, there are a num ber of health 
maintenance organizations (HM Os), with $1,755 billion in premiums in 
1991.4 These com panies can elect an exemption from the prem ium  tax in ex­
change for open enrollm ent5 and community rating.6 However, open enroll­
ment and community rating are potentially very costly and not many HM Os 
elect this exemption.
There are also a num ber of fraternal insurance companies. These com ­
panies provide coverage to  members of certain fraternal organization, such 
as the Knights of Colum bus or the Alliance of Transylvanian Saxons. In 
Ohio there are 14 domestic fratem als and 63 foreign fraternals. In 1991, 
these com panies accounted for 3.15 percent of total prem ium s written in the 
life insurance industry in Ohio.
C U R R EN T STRU CTU RE OF O H IO ’S 
INSURANCE TAX
H is t o r y  o f  I n s u r a n c e  T a x a t io n
Historically, insurance premiums are taxed, rather than notions of in­
come. This has been done for one major reason: simplicity. The calculation 
of net income for an insurance company is conceptually quite difficult as 
premiums are collected now, but losses are not realized until a num ber of 
periods henceforth. Thus, there is difficulty in determ ining net income. 
Reserves set up for future liabilities appear as income to the tax collector. 
Even if the tax collector understands the special nature of the insurance con­
tract, the tax collector and the insurer must agree on an appropriate in ter­
est rate to  discount the reserves to calculate net income for the current year. 
In addition, even if the reserves are discounted, one may question the ap­
propriateness of taxing reserves. This is because the reserves are the finan­
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cial capital backing future losses. State solvency regulatory policy requires 
that the com panies keep higher reserves than they might otherwise keep to 
reduce the risk of insolvency, and thus companies with the required reserves 
would pay m ore taxes than those which did not keep the required reserves.
Because of these problem s, and the fact that a m ethod o f properly dis­
counting the reserves was not available when insurance companies first be­
cam e taxable, a simple solution of taxing premiums was developed. In fact, 
this is the predom inant m ethod for taxing insurance com panies worldwide. 
However, its use has been strongly criticized, and a responsible state should 
recognize the implications of the premium tax for the long run viability of 
the industry.7
S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  T a x e s
Premium tax and franchise tax. Companies writing in Ohio are taxed based 
on the of 2.5 percent of their gross direct premiums w ritten (premium tax) 
and 0.6 percent of capital and surplus (franchise tax) if they are an Ohio do­
m esticated (or chartered) company.8 If the company is a foreign company 
(o r com panies chartered  outside the state of Ohio) the insurer is taxed 2.5 
percent of prem ium s less return premiums paid for cancellations and con­
siderations received for re-insurance of risks within Ohio.9 In addition, for­
eign insurers, if they provide dividends to policyholders can deduct these 
policyholder dividends if the dividend is in excess of the net cost of insur­
ance.10 The dom estic tax on the minimum basis of 0.6 percent of capital and 
surplus or two and one-half percent of direct premiums written allows small 
com panies with small capital and surplus (net w orth) to be taxed at a rela­
tively low rate. As the com pany grows and has increasing contributions to 
capital and surplus, the company pays the premium tax if it is less than the 
capital and surplus tax.
Box 12-1 shows the schematic for the domestic insurer for determining 
which tax to pay: the prem ium  tax, which is based on gross premiums, or the 
capital and surplus tax, which is based on a statutory definition of capital and 
surplus. Note that this statutory definition includes excess reserves, certain 
policy holder dividends not paid out, certain reinsurance, and non-admittcd 
assets. From this there is a deduction for ownership of stock in Ohio insur­
ance subsidiaries. For foreign companies, the tax base is direct written pre­
miums net o f policy holder dividends.
Based on current law approximately 45 percent o f the domestic life in­
dustry pays a capital and surplus tax while 65 percent of the property indus­
try pays a capital and surplus tax.
M ore property-liability com panies pay the capital and surplus tax 
Further, the property-liability com panies paying the capital and surplus tax 
account for almost 70 percent of domestic premiums. This contrasts sharply
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BOX 12-1
Insurer pays the minimum of the two taxes
2.5% G ross Premiums 0.6% of Capital & Surplus
Capital & Surplus =
Excess Reserves 
+ Statutory Reserves 
+ Policy H older Dividends 
+ Certain Reinsurance 
+ N on-adm itted Assets 
—  Common Stock Owned in Ohio Subs
with the experience in the domestic life industry, which accounts for only 6.0 
percent o f the premiums. Finally, as com pared to the industry’s median 
asset size, the property-liability companies are relatively larger than those 
companies paying capital and surplus taxes in the life industry.
Ex e m p t io n s  a n d  O m is s io n s  f r o m  t h e  T a x  B a s e
Health premiums by HMOs. Health insurance premiums sold by life and 
health insurance com panies and property-liability companies are treated 
similarly to  o ther insurance. However, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield com pa­
nies are subject to different capital and surplus requirem ents for regulatory 
solvency purposes than the rest of the industry, and are thus more able to 
take advantage of the lower tax afforded by the capital and surplus franchise 
tax.11
Some states provide some portion of the health insurance industry with 
tax advantages.12 This may reduce the cost o f insurance to the consum er as 
no premium tax is paid. A  state may desire to  prom ote the consumption of 
health insurance by reducing its cost through lower taxation.1-' In Ohio this 
is partially accomplished through the fact that the Blues can take advantage 
of their special status and pay the franchise tax rather than the premium tax. 
However, for horizontal equity purposes state policy should treat all health 
insurance providers similarly.
As part of O hio’s health care policy, HM Os arc potentially exempt from 
the premium tax. In return, the HM Os agree to have open enrollm ent and 
employ community, ra ther than individual ratings for prem ium  determ ina­
tion. There are a num ber of issues with regard to this policy. The first con­
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cerns horizontal equity. O ther types of health insurance providers do pay the 
prem ium  or franchise tax. This provides an incentive for the potential in­
sured to  choose an H M O  plan over an insurance plan. A  second issue con­
cerns w hether HM Os are insurance companies subject to a premium tax. 
HM O s, if not associated with an insurance company, may actually pay the 
corporate franchise tax ra ther than the insurance tax. This may provide the 
H M O s with a tax benefit.
Table 12-2 shows the size of the H M O  population in the state of Ohio. 
T he percentage o f individuals in H M O s will likely increase in the future. 
Thus, the potential exists for a diminishing of the sta te ’s premium tax or 
franchise tax base from traditional health insurance.
In 1991, the loss in prem ium  tax revenue if all H M O s had paid the 2.5 
percent prem ium  tax would have been $47.6 million while the loss would 
have been approximately $2.4 million if all H M O ’s had paid the franchise 
tax. The H M O  industry would pay if taxed like o ther insurers, something in 
betw een as there are some foreign HM Os operating in Ohio and there are 
som e large O hio HM Os.
As Figure 12-1 shows, H M O  prem ium s have increased over the last 12 
years. As the prem ium s increase due to individuals and groups leaving tra­
ditional insurance policies and switching to HMOs, the loss in terms of tax 
revenue increases. However, the benefit of having m ore Ohioans insured 
may be w orth the cost in term s of lost tax revenue and the distortion of the 
com petitive m arket. If this is true, it makes sense to provide this tax break 
to all providers of health coverage irrespective of organizational form in ex­
change for less restrictive underwriting practices.14
Annuity Considerations. Annuity considerations are not taxed in Ohio. A 
num ber of states, however, do tax these contracts.15 The majority of states
TABLE 12-2 
HM O Enrollm ent over Time
Year No. o f HMOs Enrollment
Percent of  
Ohio Pop
1989 34 1,294,173 11.9
1990 34 1,454,020 13.3
1991 34 1,445,891 13.2
1992 39 1,778,500 16.3
Source: Health Insurance Association of America, Source Book of 
Health Insurance Data (1990-1993).
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FIGURE 12-1. HMO premiums over time.
do not tax annuities, and the federal government also treats annuities dif­
ferently, exempting qualified pension plans from current income taxation. 
This is because annuities are thought to be savings vehicles for retirem ent, 
and the federal policy is to encourage retirem ent savings. A state that does 
not tax current annuity considerations is acting consistently with the federal 
policy, but unlike the federal government, a state that exempts annuity con­
siderations from current taxation is not able to  collect taxes when the annu­
ity is paid.
Some states tax annuities, but exempt considerations paid to qualified 
plans.16 So, if an annuity is used to fund a retirem ent savings program, then 
it is exempt; otherwise it is subject to the premium tax. To gauge the size of 
the revenues that could be obtained: if Ohio were to tax all annuity consid­
erations it could expect to receive an additional $41,900,000 in premium tax 
receipts, which would account for almost 15 percent of current premium tax 
revenues.17
A tax on annuities is a tax on savings and, for horizontal equity reasons, 
a tax must be put on o ther savings m ethods if one is placed on annuity con­
sideration. Savings are arguably not the proper subject of taxation as this is 
the source of the econom y’s investment and future consumption opportuni­
ties. Thus, a tax on savings, especially if out-of-line with o ther states would 
reduce savings and potentially impair economic development.
Workers' Compensation. W orkers’ com pensation prem ium s are also om it­
ted from the Ohio tax base, because w orkers’ com pensation insurance is 
provided by a state-run monopoly. States have different policies on how the
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w orkers’ com pensation m arket operates. Some states believe that competi­
tion will bring about lower rates while others, such as Ohio, believe that a 
state-run enterprise will serve the better business of Ohio. Because workers’ 
com pensation can be a very expensive insurance, the state could decide to 
provide the insurance free of tax to the business in Ohio. Currently, approx­
imately $2 billion o f business is written in workers’ com pensation insurance 
prem ium s and not taxed.
F ir e  M a r s h a l l  T a x
Property-liability com panies are also subject to  a Fire Marshall Tax. 
which is 0.75 percent and is applied against the proportion of property-lia­
bility prem ium s that cover fire hazards. This percentage differs depending 
on the line of insurance written. For example, fire insurance is categorized 
as 100 percent fire coverage, auto insurance is categorized as 10 percent fire 
coverage, and health insurance is categorized as 0 percent fire coverage.18
In 1992 the fire marshall tax collected $6.3 million in revenue, which is 
used to fund the Office of the State Fire Marshall. The fire marshall tax has 
been volatile over the decade of the 1980s, and the growth in revenues seems 
to  be trending downwards. The most im portant item to note, however, that 
it is com bined with the prem ium  tax, and thus the real effective rate of tax­
ation on fire related coverage is potentially greater than 2.5 percent. For ex­
am ple, including the prem ium  tax and the fire marshall tax, the effective rate 
on large domestics and foreign com panies can be as high as 3.25 percent.
R e t a l ia t o r y  T a x e s
Insurance taxation am ong the states is unique because of the interrela­
tionship betw een the taxation policies of the states. Because Congress 
granted the states com plete authority over the regulation and taxation of the 
insurance industry, subject to relatively m inor constraints, states authorize 
what has been called “ retaliatory taxation.”19 The system of retaliatory tax­
ation seems complex, but in its simplest term s says that if another state taxes 
O h io ’s com panies a t a higher rate than Ohio does, then companies in those 
high-tax states must pay to O hio the premium tax plus a tax based on the 
am ount of the difference in the taxes. For example, Alabama taxes Ohio 
com panies operating in tha t state at 4.00 percent of premiums if they cover 
A labam a risks. Thus, an A labam a company writing business in Ohio pays 
the O hio prem ium  tax at the rate of 2.5 percent of direct premiums, and an 
additional tax of 1.5 percent, which is the difference between the rate that 
an O hio com pany would pay in Alabama and the rate applicable in Ohio. 
Similarly, O hio com panies would pay retaliatory taxes to other states if the
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Ohio rate is greater than the sta te’s own rate. For example, Ohio companies 
writing in Illinois pay the Illinois premium tax of 1 percent plus an additional 
1.5 percent in retaliatory taxes to  Illinois, because Illinois insurers operating 
in Ohio would have to pay 2.5 percent to  Ohio.
One of the ideas behind the retaliation was to reduce the incentive for 
states to charge out-of-state companies extremely high rates. Many states 
discriminate against out-of-state com panies in their premium tax rates.20 
This discrimination is legal as long as it passes the equal protection clause’s 
rational basis test.21
The retaliatory tax reduces the net effect of this freedom  to tax foreign 
companies. As the rate  to foreign companies increases, the rate that the 
state’s own domestics must pay to o ther states also increases.22 This has the 
potential for making a sta te’s own companies less competitive in other 
states’ markets. The higher the state’s own rate and the bigger the sta te’s 
companies are in the national market, the more taxes the state’s companies 
pay to o ther jurisdictions and the less competitive the company is relative to 
companies in low-tax states. This, in turn, has effects on the local economy. 
As the percent o f revenues being paid to other states increases due to the 
home sta te’s tax policy, the less viable is the state’s own industry and the 
lower the employm ent opportunities there will be in the hom e state’s indus­
try. Thus, a change in the premium tax rate can have a significant effect on 
the home sta te’s industry even though the home state tax revenues do not 
change much. M ore o f the fiscal effect of this unique tax interrelationship 
will be shown in the simulation below.
The retaliatory tax was put in place by the states to keep other states from 
raising taxes from foreign companies. As a state’s rate becomes significantly 
greater than the average rate among the states, the sta te’s own companies 
start paying more to o ther jurisdictions. However, there is another side to 
this coin that can be employed to O hio’s advantage. Since a relatively large 
percentage of the O hio insurance m arket is served by out-of-state com pa­
nies, Ohio could reduce its rate below the national average and become a re­
cipient o f significant retaliatory tax revenues. In addition, as the rate 
decreases, the dom estics receive a benefit from a lower effective rate versus 
the foreign com panies who now must pay a retaliatory tax to  Ohio. Thus, re­
moving the explicit, and perhaps unconstitutional domestic tax, replacing it 
with a low, but equal tax rate on all companies, Ohio can end up with a con­
stitutional tax preference that can stim ulate the insurance industry in the 
state.
In addition, to the prem ium  tax, o ther license fees and assessments are 
also subject to inclusion in the retaliatory tax. This includes assessments for 
the insolvency funds. The insolvency funds are set up as an ex-post insol­
vency financing mechanism. If a company becomes insolvent, the fund taxes 
the insurers based on their market share to pay off the Ohio liabilities.
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These insolvency assessments are also included in the retaliatory tax calcu­
lation in a small num ber of states.23
F o r e ig n  V e r s u s  D o m e s t ic  T r e a t m e n t
Figure 12-2 shows that the ratio of domestic to foreign premiums has in­
creased over time. T he dom estic industry in 1969 represented about four 
percent of the total industry’s tax contributions. The increase in the early 
1980s is the direct result o f an increase in the capital surplus franchise tax 
rate. Since the 1991 increase, the percentage has been relatively stable. By 
1993 the dom estic industry was paying approximately 20 percent of the pre­
mium tax. In contrast, in term s of gross premiums written, the domestic in­
dustry wrote approximately 54 percent. This is another indication of the 
distribution o f the tax burden towards out-of-state companies.
A num ber of states provide some tax breaks solely to domestic compa­
nies. These tax breaks are generally of two forms: a rate reduction for in­
vestm ent in certain state assets, or an outright distinction between foreign 
and dom estic companies. O hio’s law, in contrast, is unique. For the first type 
o f preference, a company can reduce its premium tax rate if it invests in state 
securities or had a relatively high percentage of its assets invested within the 
state. A labam a, Arkansas, G eorgia, and Texas, for example, have laws like 
this. A lthough there is no explicit foreign versus dom estic distinction in the 
law, for practical purposes, only small domestics are able to take advantage 
of the rate reduction, as a large nationwide company could not be expected 
to  invest enough assets in one state to obtain a tax reduction.
1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993
Source: Ohio Department of Revenue. Annual Report (1992). 
FIGURE 12-2. Premium tax collections (foreign and domestic).
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O ther states, like Illinois, tax foreign companies differentially higher be­
cause the regulators argue that foreign companies are more difficult to reg­
ulate for solvency purposes. O ther states that employed the discriminatory 
tax as a method o f protecting their domestic industry from interstate com ­
petition have either scrapped the differentiation as a result of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Metropolitan v. Ward o r have attem pted, like Illinois, to pro­
vide a rational basis.
A breakdown o f the effective tax rates by foreign and domestic com pa­
nies in 1992 shows that the domestics do benefit from the lower capital and 
surplus tax (especially for the domestic property-liability companies). This is 
shown in Table 12-3. The largest beneficiaries here are in the property-lia- 
bility industry. O f the domestic industry a large proportion is made up of 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield premiums. Because of the Blues’ ability to use a 
smaller capital and surplus tax base for regulatory reasons, they tend to  reap 
relatively large benefits from the use of the capital-surplus tax.
A question that needs to be addressed is whether the benefits of this tax 
break are greater than the costs. One benefit may be that there are more 
small companies available to provide insurance. However, since there are 
economies of scale in the provision of insurance, these small companies are 
not likely to be able to  reap the benefits of scale economies that would allow 
them to com pete effectively with larger companies. Thus, the differential 
taxation may enable potentially inefficient companies to stay in business.
O t h e r  F e e s
There are a num ber of im portant licensing and examination fees paid by
TABLE 12-3 
1991 Ohio Insurance Effective Tax Rate 
for Foreign and Domestic Companies
Effective T ax  R ate  
(In P ercen t)
Life and Health Domestic 1.28
Foreign 1.80
Property - Liability Domestic 0.87
Foreign 2.11
Source: A uthors' calculation from  Ohio Departm ent o f Insurance Annual Report (1992) Note: 
Tax base for com parison purposes is gross prem iums written. HM O prem iums and retaliatory 
taxes paid to o ther states are excluded.
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the industry for regulatory purposes. Agents of a com pany have a $20 license 
fee, and regulatory exam inations are also charged to the firm. In 1992, these 
fees am ounted to  over $19 million. The corresponding regulatory expendi­
tures were $12.6 million. Thus, the licenses and fees m ore than pay for the 
regulation o f the industry.
G u a r a n t y  F u n d  A s s e s s m e n t s
O hio, like all o ther states except the State of New York, has a post-insol­
vency assessm ent due from all com panies doing business in Ohio during the 
year o f  an insolvency. This assessment is based on the insurer’s m arket share 
during the year a failed com pany goes insolvent. Recently, these assessments 
w ere minimal, but due to  insolvencies outside of the sta te  of Ohio during the 
mid to  late 1980s there were large assessments m ade against the surviving 
com panies doing business in Ohio. However, these assessments are cred­
itable for the life insurance guaranty fund assessment against the premium 
tax at a rate o f 20 percent a year for five years.24 T here is no corresponding 
credit for property-liability insolvencies.
T a x  A d m in is t r a t io n
T he adm inistration o f  this tax, unlike most o ther taxes in Ohio, is under 
the jurisdiction of the O hio D epartm ent of Insurance. For the domestic 
com panies the D epartm ent of Insurance calculates the tax payable based 
upon the com panies’ statutory filing of inform ational returns with the 
state.25 For the foreign com panies, the com panies themselves file a tax re­
tu rn  with the D epartm en t o f Taxation. As the dom estic company tax calcu­
lation is ra ther sim ple, it seem s efficient for the D epartm ent of Insurance to 
calculate all dom estic com pany taxes and send out bills.
COM PARISON W ITH OTH ER STATES
O h i o ’s In s u r a n c e  R e v e n u e s
O hio revenues from  the prem ium  tax have followed the national trend in 
prem ium  taxes. Figure 12-3 shows that the national trend  is increasing pre­
m ium  tax revenues for the  nation. In addition, the percentage change over 
tim e is roughly the sam e for both the state of Ohio and the o ther states. This 
implies the O hio insurance tax revenue stream  follows that of the rest of the 
country. This is to  be expected, since the states have very similar tax policies 
tow ards insurance.
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The growth in O h io ’s prem ium  tax revenues seemed to be less responsive 
to changes in the insurance industry in comparison to the nationwide growth 
in premium tax revenues from the 1960s until the middle 1980s. From 1986 
until the present, the growth rates are very close and likely reflect the in­
creasing efficiency of the insurance market. The cycle in tax revenue growth 
shown in Figure 12-4 is likely due to the cyclicality of the insurance m arket.26 
The well-known cycles in the property-liability industry are the subject of 
tremendous academ ic and industry debate as to their cause. However, no 
matter the cause o f cycles, they have an impact on revenue growth for the 
state, making revenue forecasts dependent on the insurance cycle.
The elasticities shown in Figure 12-5 are the percentage changes in pre­
mium tax as over the percentage changes in per capita income during the 
time period. The prem ium  tax income elasticity shows the stability of the tax 
revenues in changes brought about by recessions and expansions. Taxes are 
relatively stable if the income elasticity is constant or rising during a reces­
sion, and is constant o r decreasing in an expansion. One can observe peaks 
during recessions, and decreases o r relatively constant elasticities during ex­
pansions. In total, however, the insurance industry’s prem ium  taxes provide 
a relatively stable source of income to the state, even accounting for the in­
surance profit cycle.
Co m p a r is o n  o f  T a x  B u r d e n  w it h  O t h e r  St a t e s
Most states tax the insurance industry with just a prem ium  tax. A nother
1964 1968 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989
iB T o u l  U.S. Revenues A  Ohio Revenues |
Source: Insurance Information, Property-Casualty Factbook (various years) 
FIGURE 12-3. United States and Ohio premium taxes.
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Source: Insurance Information Institute, Property-Casualty Factbook (various years.)
FIGURE 12-4. Total United States and Ohio premium tax revenues (% 
changes).
Source: Authors calculations from Ohio Department o f Revenue, Annual Report (1992) 
FIGURE 12-5. Premium tax income elasticity.
Taxation o f the Insurance Industry 605
group of states uses a combination of a premium tax and an income tax, with 
a credit for o ther taxes paid. For example, if a state had both an income tax 
and a prem ium  tax, it could offer a credit for the income tax paid on the in­
come tax for prem ium  taxes paid. Alternatively, it could offer a credit on the 
premium tax for income taxes paid. However, as illustrated in Table 12-4, the 
premium tax is likely to be much g reater than the incom e tax.
There are a num ber of ways to com pare the taxation of the insurance 
industry betw een states. First, one could look at the o th e r sta te ’s tax rates. 
This is shown in A ppendix Table 12A-1 for the life industry, Table 12A-2 
for the property-liability insurance industry, Table 12A-3 for the health  in­
surance industry, and Table 12A-4 for the annuity industry. O hio’s nom i­
nal ra te  is am ong the higher rates for both the life and health  industries 
and the property-liability industry as O h io ’s tax rate for an im portant part 
of the industry is 2.5 percent. This is relatively high as there are only a 
handful of states with higher rates.27 Exam ining the tax rate tells only part 
of the story, especially in a state like O hio where a significant portion of 
the industry pays the lesser capital and surplus tax. Thus, examining the ef­
fective tax rate  provides a different inform ation about the distribution of 
the tax.
Effective tax rate. There are a num ber of ways of measuring the tax bur­
den on the Ohio insurance industry. The first is to com pare the effective rate 
for Ohio versus o ther sates’ effective rates. Table 12-5 shows the effective
TABLE 12-4
Effective Net Income Tax Rates for Various Ohio Industries 
(In Percent)
Year
Insurance
Industry Retail Trade Electronics Banking
1987 21.20 5.80 5.30 6.10
1988 16.90 5.30 5.20 6.00
1989 14.30 5.40 5.10 6.10
1990 16.70 5.10 5.00 6.50
1991 15.60 4.60 6.90 6.10
1992 17.00 6.20 5.00 5.20
Source: Price-Waterhouse and Levin and Driscoll, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation 
of the Insurance Industry in Ohio, 1987-1992. (1994)
rates based on 1991 data  for m ajor insurance states and states near Ohio 
tha t could conceivably com pete with Ohio.
In 1991 the national effective rate was 1.78 percent, while the Ohio ef­
fective rate was 1.59.2S The effective rate for Ohio seem s low. This is because 
the dom estic industry has the opportunity  of paying the lower of the fran-
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TABLE 12-5 
Effective Tax Rates for Im portan t 
Insurance States and Ohio Neighbors
State
Effective 
Tax Rate 
On Percent)
Number of 
Domestic 
Companies in 
1991
California 2.656 220
Connecticut 1.887 70
Florida 1.142 139
Illinois 0.896 366
Iowa 1.501 228
Indiana 1.160 174
Kentucky 4.046 58
Massachusetts 1.707 68
Michigan 1.193 92
New York 1.336 316
Ohio 1.588 209
Pennsylvania 1.300 264
Texas 1.931 492
Wisconsin 0.958 222
U.S. 1.728 6002
Source'. ACIR (1993). Note the figures do not include the retaliatory tax.
In 1991 if the retaliatory tax had been included the effective rate would have 
been approximately 1.87.
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chise tax or the prem ium  tax, and this reduces the effective tax rate of the 
Ohio insurance industry. If everyone paid the actual tax rate of 2.5 percent 
then the effective rate would be close to  2.5 percent. O ther states in the re­
gion, such as M ichigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois, 
have lower effective rates while Kentucky seems to be the only state within 
the region to have a higher effective tax rate. Illinois, an im portant insurance 
state with a very low effective rate, does not tax its domestic industry with a 
premium tax. Similarly, Michigan’s low effective rate is attributed to its low 
tax rate. However, it should be noted that there is an additional tax not ac­
counted for in these firms. This tax is the retaliatory tax which is discussed 
further below. This retaliatory tax is paid by the domestic companies to 
other states. Estim ates of the retaliatory tax for the Ohio insurance industry 
place it at over $50-60 million per year.
A nother way is to  look at the per capita burden. This is shown in Table
12-6 for a num ber of years. Table 12-6 contains a great deal of inform ation, 
but what it shows is that Ohio is under taxing the insurance industry on a per 
capita basis relative to  the national average, but that over time O hio’s per 
capita tax burden has been increasing. Among its neighbors, O hio is bet­
tered only by Illinois and Michigan, which is a direct function of these states’ 
tax policies: Illinois does not tax its domestics and Michigan has a low rate. 
In 1989 Ohio ranked 42nd but, by 1992 O hio’s rank had increased to 39th. At 
the same time the U nited States average rank fell from 23 to  27. Thus, 
Ohio’s burden as m easured on a per capita basis, while less than the national 
average, is increasing relative to the nation as a whole. Again, however, the 
retaliatory tax is not included. In 1991, if the Ohio industry’s payments to 
other states were included, the per capita burden would increase by just over 
$4. This would increase O hio’s rank by about 10.
Another way to determ ine a relative tax burden is to look at a standardized 
tax base across states and a standardized tax rate across states. Using the tax 
base and the tax rate one can determ ine a standardized “capacity.” By com ­
paring actual revenues received by the state for a particular tax to the capac­
ity determined by the standardized tax base and standardized tax rate, one can 
then determ ine w hether a state is over- or under-taxing its capacity.
This m ethodology is what the Advisory Commission on Intergovern­
mental Relations (A C IR ) uses in its study of state tax structures. For the in­
surance industry the standardized tax base is gross w ritten premiums and the 
standardized rate is 1.73 percent (representing the U nited States average tax 
rate). Figure 12-6 shows that in 1991 Ohio under-utilized its capacity rela­
tive to the national average. However, with the exception of California, 
Connecticut, Kentucky and Texas, the remaining states are also under-uti­
lizing their capacities. In fact, o ther than Kentucky, O hio has the highest ca­
pacity utilization relative to its neighbors.
The figure should be interpreted with care, however, because like the ef­
fective tax rate, the A C IR ’s methodology does not say anything about the
TABLE 12-6
Insurance Tax and  Per C apita Insurance Tax Revenues by State, 1989-1992
1989 1990 1991 1992
Total 
(in $000s)
Per
Capita Rank
Total 
(in $000s)
Per
Capita Rank
Total 
(in $000s)
Per
Capita Rank
Total 
(in $000s)
Per
Capita Rank
U.S. 7.340.691 29.57 23 7.369.604 29.63 28 7.721.145 30.69 24 7,875.621 30.88 27
California 1.314.750 45.24 5 1.170.831 39 34 9 1.287.740 42.39 9 1.173.297 38.01 13
Connecticut 175.898 54.31 1 170,163 51.77 2 174.122 52.91 3 160.843 49.02 7
Florida 250.144 19.74 47 322.915 24.87 40 319,567 24.07 41 311,977 23.13 42
Illinois 255.057 21.88 43 166.758 14.59 51 192.876 16.71 51 197,720 17.00 51
Indiana 103.436 18.49 49 107.516 19.39 47 121,809 21.71 44 122.788 21.69 44
Iowa 84.878 29.89 22 86.976 31.32 22 92,288 33.02 18 97.447 34.54 18
Kentucky 151.199 40 57 7 187.573 50.90 3 214,688 57.82 1 206,917 55.10 2
Michigan 76.601 8 26 52 78.647 8 46 52 175,973 18.26 49 178,304 18.89 48
Minnesota 120.639 27.71 29 122.486 28.00 33 129,618 29.25 29 130,617 29.16 33
New York 582.240 32.44 17 699.529 38 88 10 594,889 32 94 19 610.046 33.67 24
Ohio 252,271 23.13 42 255,149 23.52 41 269,929 24.68 40 281,301 25.54 39
Pennsylvania 225.229 27 84 28 352.261 29.65 27 362.473 30.30 25 404,806 33.71 22
Texas 441.550 25.99 35 524.901 30.90 24 595.446 34.32 15 516,081 29.23 22
Wisconsin 76.693 15.76 50 76.882 15.72 50 83,278 16.81 50 68,975 13.78 52
Source: Stale Government Finances (various year»); Bureau of the Census Population Projections. 1990-2020, and Insurance Information Institute Factbook (1994). Note that the per 
capita tax burdens do not include the retaliatory tax. Ohio's burden would be increased by $4.50 per person in 1991 if retaliatory taxes were included.
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FIGURE 12-6. Percentage o f insurance tax capacity (United States average =
100%).
distribution o f the  tax burden between foreign and dom estic com panies and 
between large and small companies. In addition, it docs not include the re­
taliatory tax. Also, O hio provides a tax differential for small (and potentially 
mid-sized) dom estics that significantly reduces their tax burden, leaving 
large domestics and foreign com panies with a higher burden.
Figure 12-7 also shows the behavior of im portant insurance states and 
neighbors of O hio taxation of insurance capacity during the last decade. 
Over time, O hio’s taxation of the insurance industry has rem ained constant, 
as the rate appears close to 100 percent during the years studied by the 
ACIR. Illinois, Indiana, Florida, and Wisconsin also experienced relatively 
constant tax policies over time. States with a large variation over time, such 
as Kentucky and Texas, are changing their insurance tax policies and this is 
reflected in the wide variation of the use of capacity. O f the states shown in 
Figure 12-7 only Iowa has experienced a declining trend. This is likely due 
to its desire to encourage the developm ent of the Iowan insurance industry.
M AIN ISSUES A N D  PROBLEMS 
Th e  P r o s  a n d  C o n s  o f  P r e m iu m  T a x a t io n
Why use a premium tax? As m entioned above, a prem ium  tax is a rela­
tively simple tax. In general, a company merely adds up its gross written pre-
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FIGURE 12-7. Percentage o f  tax capacity fo r insurance premium tax.
miums and applies a tax rate to  determ ine the tax bill. This is a very simple 
process for the com pany and a simple tax for the state to adm inister and 
audit. In addition, the prem ium  tax generally produces a steadily increasing 
source of revenue.
A nother reason a prem ium  tax is preferable to o ther taxes is that the 
states have a long history of using this tax and there  have been few com­
plaints. A lternatives such as the income tax are difficult (in theory) to im­
plem ent. T hus, sim plicity, historical inertia , and the difficulty of 
im plem entation of alterative taxes are the m ajor reasons to keep and use the 
prem ium  tax.
Why States should not use a Premium Tax. T here are a num ber of reasons 
to avoid using a prem ium  tax, as outlined by Skipper.29 First, the premium 
tax is regressive, m eaning that the lower-income insured pay a higher por 
tion o f their income in these taxes than do the higher-incom e insured.
Second, since cash value life insurance can be a m ethod of savings, a pre­
mium tax on cash value life insurance is a tax on savings, which can reduce 
the incentive to  save or provide incentives for the consum er to  purchase a 
savings product from ano ther financial service provider.30
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Third, the prem ium  tax is regressive against age, health status, risk clas­
sification, and occupation. For example, older consum ers pay higher p re ­
miums for life insurance and non-group health insurance. Thus, older 
people pay a higher proportion of their income in prem ium  taxes than do 
the younger insured. The reverse is true  for auto policies, as young people 
are considered higher auto  risks and thus pay m ore prem ium  taxes relative 
to o lder drivers. In addition, the insured who are in poor health or in haz­
ardous occupations pay higher health  and disability prem ium s relative to 
those in better health  and lower-risk occupations. Finally, people who live 
in high-risk areas, such as rural areas w ithout nearby fire departm ents or 
those in areas m ore prone to  natural disasters, will pay more in prem ium  
taxes as their prem ium s will be higher than those o f people living in low- 
risk areas.
Fourth, consum ers who purchase small policies pay m ore taxes per unit 
of insurance than those who purchase larger policies. This is because p re­
miums are set to  cover the cost of the risk plus the cost o f administering and 
maintaining the policy. This adm inistration expense is a fixed cost, and for 
small policies percentage of the prem ium  is relatively high com pared to 
larger policies. This makes the small policy (which contains a higher pro­
portion of expense costs relative to risk costs) bear a larger per insurance 
unit cost of the prem ium  tax.
Fifth, there are a num ber of insurance substitutes, most notably self-in­
surance, which are  not taxed. In Ohio, this is more likely to  be a problem  in 
the health insurance area. A company could potentially reduce its health 
care expenses by 2.5 percent by self-insuring. This could be a non-trivial ex­
pense for health care coverage.
The availability o f  tax-free self-insurance may cause the insured to  opt 
out of the m arket in times of insurance shortages like that experienced in the 
liability lines during the mid-1980s. As premiums are bid up, consum ers will 
reduce their purchases of insurance and self-insure.
Sixth, the prem ium  tax also has problem s when there is differential taxa­
tion between foreign and domestic companies. U nder O hio’s tax law, com ­
panies may be able to benefit from a lower effective tax rate through the 
capital and surplus franchise tax. Smaller companies are not likely to be as 
efficient as larger com panies because of the trem endous economies of scale 
in the insurance industry. Thus, the tax preference can protect inefficient 
domestic firms from  com petition in the free and open market. In addition, 
since capital and surplus are not apportioned to all states where an insurer 
operates, the tax break benefits and encourages single state companies, thus 
concentrating ra ther the spreading risk.31
Finally, the prem ium  tax must be paid irrespective of w hether the in­
surer earns a profit. This m eans the tax is regressive against start-up firms 
those that are losing money. O hio’s tax law provides an alternative tax for 
small com panies through the capital and surplus franchise tax. Since this
612  A B L U E P R I N T  F O R  T A X  R E F O R M
tax typically benefits sm aller com panies, a large insurer that is in financial 
difficulty is hu rt by the prem ium  tax and this can affect the risk of insol­
vency.
T he prem ium  tax is regressive against profits, and Table 12-5 shows the 
effect of this regressivity by com paring effective tax rates based on net in­
com e for some industries in Ohio. Neubig (1994) uses a simulation to com­
pute  effective tax rates for a num ber of industries.32 The tax rate is 
significantly higher for the insurance industry than for o ther selected indus­
tries in Ohio. However, these o ther industries (with the exception of bank­
ing) are also subject to a sales tax and thus the com parison is not as clean. 
T he best com parison would be between the two financial service industries: 
banking and insurance. The difference here is 200-300 percent each year. 
Since banks do com pete against insurers and other financial institutions, 
horizontal equity requires that com petitors be treated  equally.
Because of the nature o f the insurance tax system in O hio and the other 
states, there should be two m ajor effects on Ohio com panies of changing 
the prem ium  tax rate. The first is that taxes payable to the state of Ohio 
change, and the second is th a t taxes payable to o ther states by Ohio com­
panies change due  to  the operation  of the retaliatory tax. A  tax increase, for 
exam ple, would increase the  prem ium  taxes due to  O hio as well as the pre­
m ium  taxes due by O hio insurers to states with lower prem ium  tax rates. 
Similarly, a decrease in tax rates would lower Ohio prem ium  tax collections 
as well as lowering prem ium  taxes paid to o ther states for retaliatory pur­
poses, but may cause an increase in retaliatory taxes collected from foreign 
com panies.
SIM ULATION OF O H IO ’S 
IN SU R A N C E  TAX STR U C TU R E
This section is divided into three parts. First, we examine the effect of 
changing taxes on the insurance industry examining the effects on both the 
life and non-life industries. Second, we examine the effect of a tax changes 
on the life and health  industry. Finally, we examine the effect o f the retalia­
tory tax on the O hio dom estic industry and the resulting revenue change to 
the state.
T h e  P r o p e r t y - L ia b il it y  I n d u s t r y  S im u l a t io n
Table 12-7 shows the results o f a simulation of changing the tax rate on 
the property-liability industry. The sim ulation shows that the domestic tax 
revenue falls as the prem ium  tax is reduced from 2.5 percent to 2.0 percent. 
As the tax rate falls, prem ium s are taxed at a lower rate. Those companies 
that can pay the lower prem ium  tax will do so. However, the franchise tax is
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TABLE 12-7
Property-Liability Industry Sim ulation Results, 1992
A. Property-Liability Simulation o f Changing Premium Tax Structure Holding Capital and
Surplus Franchise Tax constant (in $ millions).
A lternative Prem ium  Tax Rates
2.00% 2.25% 2.50% 2.75% 3.00%
Domestic Com panies
Premium Tax Revenues 8.56 9.53 10.50 11.37 12.40
Franchise Tax Revenues 25.38 25.49 25.57 25.74 25.74
Total Domestic Tax Payable 33.94 35.02 36.07 37.11 38.14
Number o f Companies Paying Franchise Tax 67 68 70 73 73
Foreign Com panies
Premium Tax Revenues 85.26 94.45 104.36 114.57 124.80
Toul 119.20 129.47 140 43 151.68 162.94
B. Property-Liability Capital and Surplus Franchise Tax Simulation Holding Premium Tax Rate
Constant (in S millions)
A lternative C apital and Surplus Franchise Tax Rates
0.20% 0.30% 0.40% 0.50% 0.60% 0.70% 0.80% 0.90% 1.00%
Total Domestic Tax 
Revenues
16.68 22.82 27.42 31.80 36.07 40.33 44.56 48.39 51.48
Franchise Tax Revenues 
on Capita! and Surplus
15.19 14.39 17.64 21.46 25.57 29.62 33.85 27.45 30.54
Number o f Firms Paying 
C&S Tax
86 80 76 73 70 67 67 62 62
Premium Tax Revenues 1.49 8.43 9.78 10.34 10.5 10.71 10.71 20.94 20.94
Number o f Firms Paying 
Premium Tax
21 27 31 34 37 40 40 45 45
Note: Current tax scenario highlighted in grey.
still in effect and there  is little change in the num ber of companies paying 
the franchise tax over the premium tax as shown in Panel B..
As the tax ra te  increases the am ount of tax payable to  Ohio increases, 
with the increase coming from the increase in the prem ium  tax. For the fo r­
eign companies, the change in the prem ium  tax directly affects the prem ium  
tax due. As the rate increases, the revenues increase proportionally, while if 
the rate is decreased the revenue decreases similarly.
L if e  I n s u r a n c e  I n d u s t r y  S im u l a t io n
Table 12-8 shows the life insurance simulation results. The results are 
similar to those o f the property-liability simulation. As the premium tax rate 
increases, the num ber of companies paying the franchise tax increases
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TABLE 12-8 
Life Insurance Sim ulation Results 
Holding Franchise Rate C onstant (In M illions)
A. Premium Tax Simulation for the Life Insurance Industry.
Alternative P rem ium  Tax Rates
2.00% 2.25% 2.50% 2.75% 3.00%
Domestic Com panies
Premium Tax Revenues 8.01 8.90 9.55 4.78 2.88
Franchise Tax Revenues 1.87 1.98 2.27 8.19 9.96
Total Domestic Tax Payable 9.88 10.88 11.82 12.97 12.84
Number o f  Companies Paying Franchise Tax 29 28 27 23 22
Foreign Com panies
Premium Tax Revenues 99.34 111.76 124.18 136.60 149.02
Total 109.22 122.64 136 00 149.57 161.86
B Franchise Tax Simulation Results for the Life Insurance Industry
A lternative  C apital and Surp lus Franchise Tax Rates
0.20% 0.30% 0.40% 0.50% 0.60% 0.70% 0.80% 0 9 0 % 1.00%
Total Domestic Tax 
Revenues
5.00 7.01 8.80 10.33 11.84 11.19 11.47 11.70 11.93
Franchise Tax Revenues 
on Capital and Surplus
0.58 1.39 2.12 3.79 2.29 9.03 9.65 9.65 9.65
Number o f  Firms Paying 
C&S Tax
32 32 32 30 27 24 21 17 13
Premium Tax Revenues 4.42 5.62 6.68 6.54 9.55 2.16 1.82 2.05 2.28
Number o f Firms Paying 
Premium Tax
17 17 28 25 22 19 17 17 17
Note: Current tax scenario highlighted in grey.
slightly and the to tal am ount of revenue increases slightly. As the rate in­
creases, however, the prem ium  tax becomes the lesser o f the capital tax and 
prem ium  tax revenues decline. Franchise tax revenues increase almost 
enough to offset the loss o f the prem ium  tax revenues when the rate in­
creased to 3.0 percent. For the foreign com panies the rate changes directly 
affect the prem ium  tax bill. As the rate increases the foreign premium tax 
bill increases and  as the rate  decreases the foreign tax bill decreases. 
Prem ium  tax changes have a larger revenue affect in the foreign market 
them  in the dom estic m arket.
Panel B of the Table 12-8 shows the effect of changing the capital and sur­
plus rate on the revenues collected from the dom estic industry. The c u r r e n t  
ra te  is 0.6 percent. Reductions in the rate cause the num ber of c o m p a n i e s  
paying the capital and surplus tax to increase and the am ount collected by
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both the prem ium  tax and the capital and surplus franchise tax to decrease. 
As the franchise tax ra te  increases, the num ber of firms paying the franchise 
tax decreases, but the franchise tax revenues increase dramatically. In con­
trast, as the tax rate  increases the prem ium  tax bill falls as more is collected 
through the franchise tax. Overall, the total tax bill from domestics increases 
as the franchise tax rate increases from 0.2 percent to 1.0 percent, but at the 
cusp of moving from  0.6 percent to 0.7 percent, the total am ount of tax de­
creases slightly. This is due to the fact that the mixture of companies paying 
the franchise tax changes dramatically. Certain com panies with previously 
large prem ium  tax bills are now paying a slightly lower franchise tax.
Re t a l ia t o r y  T a x  S im u l a t io n
The retaliatory tax due to  Ohio is relatively small, am ounting to approxi­
mately $2.5 million in 1993 and representing 0.9 percent of the total fran­
chise and prem ium  tax bill for insurance com panies. However, the 
retaliatory tax paid by O hio companies to the rest of the states is substantial. 
Through a sim ulation of the retaliatory tax provision of O hio’s insurance tax 
law it was determ ined that at the current rate, Ohio com panies paid ap­
proximately $58 billion to o ther states. Table 12-9 shows the results o f the 
simulation. As the rate is reduced from the current 2.5 percent, we see an in­
crease in the am ount collected by Ohio. The am ount collected does not
TABLE 12-9 
R etaliatory Tax Sim ulation (In Millions)
Collected by 
Ohio
Paid to Other States
Rate Total Life Property-
Liability
Total
2.50 2.54 12.38 46.00 58.38
2.25 3.26 8.20 26.38 34.58
2.00 5.32 4.66 10.85 15.51
1.75 19.79 2.65 5.43 8.08
1.50 34.72 1.33 2.53 3.86
1.35 43.72 0.66 0.77 1.42
Note: Current tax situation is highlighted in grey.
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seem  to increase dram atically until the rate falls below 2.0 percent. This is 
to  be expected, since the U nited States average rate is slightly less than 2.0 
percent. In addition, as the rate falls the am ount paid to o ther states de­
creases. This is also expected, as the states’ retaliatory provisions require 
paym ent only if the hom e state taxes at a higher am ount. Thus, Ohio com­
panies would benefit dram atically as a result of a reduction in the rate.
REFORM  OPTIONS A N D  IMPLICATIONS
O p t io n s  f o r  R e f o r m
Equalize foreign and domestic rates. By trading all foreign and domestic 
com panies similarly it would be possible to lower the effective tax rate. This 
is shown in Table 12-10. Table 12-10 has the total premiums written for the 
O hio insurance industry. For the first com parison, by adding up all the life 
prem ium s (net o f annuities) and including the fraternal life premiums to the 
sum  o f property-casualty prem ium s (net o f H M O  prem ium s) and dividing 
this by the total prem ium  and franchise tax collected, the revenue neutral 
ra te  would by 1.83 percent in 1993. This is shown as Ratio 1. Over the last 
five years R atio 1 has been relatively stable ranging between 1.77 percent to 
1.83 percent. Adding the fire marshall and retaliatory tax collections into the 
num erator yields Ratio 2. Thus, the revenue neutral level of insurance taxa­
tion would be 1.87 percent in 1993. This am ount has ranged between 1.85­
1.90 percent in the  last five years.
N ote that R atio  2 rate is biased upward. This is due to the operation of 
the retaliatory tax. At a rate o f 1.90 percent, the O hio rate will be lower than 
the national average and potentially significant retaliatory tax revenues will 
accrue. These additional revenues could then be employed to lower the ef­
fective rate further, which in turn will generate a fu rther collection of retal­
iatory taxes. Table 12-9 shows that by moving from a rate of 2.50 percent to 
a ra te  o f say, 1.75 percent will yield almost $20 million in retaliatory collec­
tions. Those effected by equalizing the rate would be those in the domestic 
industry paying the capital and surplus tax. These are predom inantly small 
property-liability com panies and the Blues. However, the larger companies 
operating  in in tersta te  m arkets would benefit tremendously because the re­
taliatory tax burden  would be dram atically reduced. At an effective rate ap­
proaching 1.35 percent our sim ulation predicts a net gain of $43 m illion- 
due to  foreign com pany paym ents of retaliatory taxes due to Ohio.
Equalize tax treatment between HMOs and health insurers. By exempting 
all health  insurers and H M O s from paying the prem ium  or franchise tax, 
there  would be a loss of revenue. If we were to use a rate applicable to all 
o ther insurers, the  effective rate on gross prem ium s w ritten net of policy­
holder dividends would be approxim ately 1.64 percent (in Ratio 2A). This is
T A B L E  1 2 - 1 0
Calculated Effective Rates from Broadening the Tax Base and Taxing All Premium s Equally
1993 1992 1991 1990 1989
Total Life Premiums and Annuity Considerations $9,081,722,000 $7,497,835,000 $7,194,570,066 $7,169,898,105 $6,565,924,100
- Domestic annuity considerations 178,219,000 221,949,000 183,739,076 125,871,164 143,772,221
-Foreign annuity considerations 1,440,366,000 1.473,470,000 1.515,980,025 1,625,038,500 1,472.956,281
+ all Fraternal Premiums 223,328,000 249,892.000 197,718,328 168,791,724 148,232,527
Net Life Premiums 7,686,465,000 6,052,308,000 5,692,569,293 5,587,780,165 5,097,428,125
Total PC Premiums 12,285,361,000 11,554,705,000 11,069,768.005 10,670,968,663 10,029,780,202
-Domestic HMOs 2,378,568,000 2,183,931,000 1,900.930.864 1,593,099,358 1,317,552,690
-Foreign HMOs 88,315.000 43,787.000 82.547,481 85,341,646 30,687.230
Net PC Prems 9,818,478,000 9,326,987,000 9,086,289.660 8.992,527,659 8,681,540.282
Total Net Premiums (Net Life +  Net PC) 17,504,943,000 15,379.295.000 14,778,858.953 14.580.307,824 13,778,968,407
Total Premium & Franchise Tax collected 319,565,254 282,668,411 270,980,387 259,462,913 244,254,539
Total Premium, Franchise, Fire Marshall & Retaliatory Taxes 327,357,383 291,489,583 280,947,009 270,274,666 255,056,067
(1) Ratio of Premium and Franchise Taxes to Total Net 1.83% 1.84% 1.83% 1.78% 1.77%
(2) Ratio of All taxes to Total Premiums 1.87% 1.90% 1.90% 1.85% 1.85%
(1A) Ratio 1 with HMOs Paying Premium Tax 1.60% 1.61% 1.62% 1.60% 1.61%
(2A) Ratio 2 with HMOs Paying Premium Tax 1.64% 1.66% 1.68% 1.66% 1.69%
Source: Ohio Departmcnf of Insurance. Annual Report and unpublished data. Nole: Equalized tax rale does not include potential retaliatory taxes collected by 
the State of Ohio as a result of lowering the effective rate. Inclusion of such taxes will lower the effective rate.
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still less than the current 2.5 percent rate, and is lower than the national av­
erage effective tax rate. In addition, the simulation o f the retaliatory tax 
shows that by reducing O hio’s effect rate it is possible to  increase Ohio’s col­
lections from the retaliatory tax by m ore than $20 million. This could be 
used to lower the effective ra te  further.
Employ an income tax on the insurance industry. Since the premium tax is 
a tax on gross receipts ra ther than net income there is a relatively large dif­
ference between the burden on a corporation paying a net income tax and 
the burden on an insurance com pany paying a prem ium  tax, all o ther things 
equal. Table 12-4 above shows that the effective income tax rate on the bank­
ing industry is about one-third that on the insurance industry.
The two industries should have approximately the same burden, as they 
are similar in many respects. In 1992, for example, the effective net income 
tax rate was 17 percent. By reducing that rate to what a non-financial cor­
poration  pays, it would be possible to lessen the burden. However, the ef­
fective tax rates shown in Table 12-4 do not include the effect of sales or 
o th e r property taxes, and thus a strong argum ent can be made that the ef­
fective rate need not be reduced to the 5-6 percent range.
A n income tax could be im plem ented relatively well, as insurers currently 
pay federal incom e taxes and, as with the non-financial corporations, Ohio 
could piggy-back on the federal definition of income. This would increase 
horizontal equity, especially if o ther financial institutions were taxed on an 
incom e basis. T he problem s with piggy-backing on the federal definition of 
net taxable incom e are three-fold. First, there is still some debate over the 
p ro p er definition of income for an insurance company, and this debate be­
com es even m ore technical depending on the organizational form of the in­
surer, .i.e. w hether it is a stock o r m utual company. Second, by tying to the 
federal definition, O hio takes all the potential problem s of defining income 
and incorporates them into its tax law. Third, an im portant issue concerns 
the appropriate  apportionm ent formula. Since insurers do not have large 
am ounts o f property, it may be appropriate to use a single factor formula 
based on sales o r gross prem ium s written. Most states with corporate in­
com e taxes on insurance use this single factor apportionm ent formula. This 
form ula would benefit dom estic insurance com panies for exactly the same 
reasons that single sales apportionm ent factor in the general corporate in­
com e tax would benefit O hio corporations.
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A PPEN D IX  A  
PREM IUM  TAX RATES FOR VARIOUS LINES 
OF INSURANCES
TABLE 12A-1 
Life Insurance Prem ium  Tax Rates, 1993
State
Domestic 
Rate %
Foreign 
Rate % State
Domestic 
Rate %
Foreign 
Rate %
Alabama (1) 1.00 3.00 Nebraska 1.00 1.00
Alaska 2.70 2.70 Nevada (2) 3.50 3.50
Arizona 2.00 2.00 New Hampshire 2.00 2.00
Arkansas 1 (1) 2.50 2.50 New Jersey 2.01 2.01
California 2.35 2.35 New Mexico (1) 3.00 3.00
Colorado 2.25 2.25 New York (6) 0.80 0.80
Connecticut 2.00 2.00 North Carolina (7) 1.90 1.90
Delaware 2.00 2.00 North Dakota 2.00 2.00
D C . 2.25 2.25 Ohio 2.50 2.50
Florida 1.75 1.75 Oklahoma (10) 2.25 2.25
Georgia (1) 0.50 2.25 Oregon 2.25 2.25
Hawaii 2.75 2.75 Pennsylvania 2.00 2.00
Idaho 3.00 3.00 Rhode Island 2.00 2.00
Illinois 0.00 2.00 South Carolina 0.75 0.75
Indiana 2.00 2.00 South Dakota 2.50 2.50
Iowa 2.00 2.00 Tennesse (1) 1.75 2.00
Kansas 1.00 2.00 T exas(I) 2.40 2.40
Kentucky 2.00 2.00 Utah 2.25 2.25
Louisiana 2.25 2.25 Vermont 2.00 2.00
Maine 2.00 2.00 Virginia (2) 2.25 2.25
Maryland 2.00 2.00 Washington 2.00 2.00
Massachusetts 2.00 2.00 West Virginia 3.00 3.00
Michigan 1.33 1.33 Wisconsin (8) 2.00 2.00
Minnesota 2.00 2.00 Wyoming 1.60 1.60
Mississippi 3.00 3.00
Missouri 2.00 2.00
Montana (5) 2.75 2.75
Source: CCH, State Tax Guide, ACLI
(1) Can reduce if investing in assets within the state.
(2) Domestic mutuals pay 1.00%.
(3) Franchise tax on all legal reserve mutuals based domestically.
(4) Franchise tax based upon authorized capital stock.
(5) Plus an additional 7.00% surcharge.
(6) Premium tax and income tax are payable up to 2.6% of premiums.
(7)7.25% for 1992.
(8) Domestic rate is graduated and increases to foreign.
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TABLE 12A-2 
S tate Prem ium  Tax R ates on P&C Com panies, 1993
Slate
Domestic 
Rate %
Foreign 
Rate %
Fire
R ate’ State
Domesti 
c Rate 
%
Foreign 
Rate %
Fire
Rate
Alabama 4.00 1.00 + 0.08 Nebraska 1.00 1.00 1.08
Alaska 2.70 2.70 + 0.08 Nevada 3.50 3.50
Arizona 2.00 2.00 2.20 New Hampshire 2.00 2.00
Arkansas (1) 2.50 2.50 New Jersey 2.01 2.01
California 2.35 2.35 New Mexico (2) 3.00 1.90
Colorado 2.25 2.25 New York (12) 1.30 1.30
Connecticut 2.00 2.00 North Carolina (13) 1.99 1.33 3.32
Delaware 1.75 2.00 2.00 North Dakota 1.75 1.75
D C . 2.25 2.25 Ohio(9) 2.50 2.50 3.25
Rorida 1.75 1.75 1.00 Oklahoma (10) 2.25 2.25 2.63
Georgia (2) 2.25 0.50 Oregon 2.25 2.25 3.25 1
Hawaii 4.70 4.70 Pennsylvania 2.00 2.00
Idaho (2) 3.00 1.60 Rhode Island 2.00 2.00
Il!inois(S> 0.00 2.00 2.50 South Carolina 1.25 1.25 2.35
Indiana (2) 2.00 2.00 2.50 South Dakota 2.50 2.50 2.55
Iowa 2.00 2.00 Tennessee 2.50 2.50 3.25
Kansas 2.00 1.00 2.00 Texas(2) 3.50 3.50
Kentucky 3.50 3.50 4.25 Utah 2.25 2.25
Louisiana (4) 1.25 1.25 2.00 Vermont 2.00 2.00
Maine 2.00 2.00 3.00 Virginia 2.25 2.25
Maryland (2X6) 2.00 2.00 2.00 Washington 2.00 2.00
M assachusetts 12) 2.28 2.28 West Virginia 3.00 3.00 4.oo ;
Michigan (11) 1.33 1.33 Wisconsin 2.00 2.00 2.38
Minnesota 2.00 2.00 Wyoming 1.60 1.60
Mississippi 3.00 3.00 4.00
Missouri (7) 2.00 2.00
Montana (8) 2.75 2.75 3.75
Source: CCH, Multistate Tax Guide, NAIC. Retaliatory Tax Manual (1993).
'F ire  marshall taxes are added on to fire related lines o f insurance. For states with differential rates between foreign and 
domestics, the rate is shown as an add on. for states with non discrimination between foreign and domestic, the rate shown is 
the total and final rate.
(1) Retaliatory taxes are 0  for companies with 13% or more of their assets in Arkansan owned companies.
(2) Qualified companies with investment in state can conceivably reduce to rate of domestics.
(3) Also corporate income tax (Indiana Financial Institutions Tax) o f  8.5% on AG1.
(4) Including retaliatory taxes.
(5) Domestics pay an income tax.
(6) No premium tax payable for domestic mutual fire companies.
(7) Small mutual taxed lower.
(8) There is an additional 7% surcharge on premiums.
(9) Fire rate is maximum possible fire rate. Fire rate is 0.75 percent times the amount o f  fire business contained in the line.
(10) Can reduce up to 50% if  company has home office in state
(11) Michigan Single Business Tax taxes premiums at 1.33%.
(12) Domestics pay 1 percent on gross investment income.
(14) Domestic fire pays 2.66
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TABLE 12A-3 
H ealth Insurance on Annuity Prem ium s, 1993
State
Domestic 
Rate %
Foreign 
Rate %
Blue Cross 
Exemption* State
Domestic 
Rate %
fo re ig n  
Rate %
Blue Cross 
Exemption*
Alabama 1.00 3.00 Nebraska (2) 0.50 0.50
Alaska 2.70 2.70 Nevada 3.50 3.50
Arizona 2.00 2.00 New Hampshire 2.00 2.00 Yes
Arkansas 2.50 2.50 New Jersey (3) 1.05 1.05
California 2.35 2.35 New Mexico 3.00 3.00
Colorado 2.25 2.25 New York (4) 0.80 0.80
Connecticut 2.00 2.00 North Carolina 1.90 1.90
Delaware 2.00 2.00 (8) 1.75 1.75
D C . 2.25 2.25 North Dakota 2.50 2.50
Florida 1.75 1.75 Ohio (9) 2.25 2.25
Georgia 2.25 2.25 Oklahoma 0.00 2.25
Hawaii 4.70 4.70 Oregon 2.00 2.00
Idaho 3.00 3.00 Yes Pennsylvania 2.00 2.00 Yes
Illinois 0.00 2.00 Rhode Island 1.25 1.25
Indiana 2.00 2.00 South Carolina 2.50 2.50
Iowa 2.00 2.00 South Dakota 1.75 2.00
Kansas 1.00 2.00 Tennessee 2.40 2.40
Kentucky 0.00 2.00 Texas 2.25 2.25
Louisiana 2.25 2.25 Utah 2.00 2.00
Maine 2.00 2.00 Vermont 2.25 2.25
Maryland 2.00 2.00 Yes Virginia 2.00 2.00
Massachusetts 2.00 2.00 Yes Washington 3.00 3.00
Michigan 1.33 1.33 West Virginia 0.00 0.00
Minnesota (7) 2.00 2.00 Wisconsin (5) 1.60 1.60
Mississippi 3.00 3.00 Wyoming (6)
Missouri 2.00 2.00
Montana(l) 2.75 2.75 Yes
Source: A C U . Premium Tax Manual.
•Not necessarily a complete list.
(1) Also, surtax o f 7% (July 1. 1992 - June 30. 1993).
(2) .5% represents "Group* rate, individual rate is 1 %.
(3) 1.05% represents 'G roup* rate. Individual rate is 2.1%.
(4) Maximum tax liability is 2.6%  o f premiums. Additional surcharge based on franchise tax.
(5) Domestic companies pay no premium tax. but pay a 3.5% license fee on apportioned gross income.
(6) Will be 1.2% in 1993. and .75% after 1994
(7) Rate o f  1 % on Blues commences in 1996.
(8) Blues taxed at 0.50%.
(9) Domestic companies pay the minimum of 2.5% gross premiums tax o r 0.6% Capital and surplus tax.
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TABLE 12A-4 
S tate Tax R ates on Annuity Prem ium s, 1993
State
Tax Rate on 
Qualified 
Retirement 
Plans
Tax 
Rate %
Alabama 1.00 1.00
California 0.50 2.35
District of Columbia 2.25 2.25
Florida (1) 1.00 1.00
Iowa 2.00
Kansas 2.00
Kentucky 2.00 2.00
Maine 2.00
Mississippi 2.00
Nevada 3.50
North Carolina 1.90
South Dakota 1.25
West Virginia 1.00 1.00
Wyoming 1.00
Sources: CCH, State Tax Guide, and ACLI.
Note: All other states do no* tax annuity premiums. 
(1) Exempt if tax savings is passed to customer
A PPE N D IX  B 
DESCRIPTIO N O F TH E OHIO INSURANCE TAX 
SIM ULATION PROCESS
D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  S i m u l a t i o n
The simulation of the insurance tax used the data compiled by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). These data are statutory filings 
with the states and contain nearly all the information necessary to calculate a tax­
payer’s actual tax liability.
D o m e s t i c  C o m p a n i e s
Using information provided by the Department of Insurance and the N a t io n w id e  
Insurance Group, we calculated the domestic tax bill for each company in m u c h  the 
same way the Insurance Department would calculate it. A very few a s s u m p t i o n s  
needed to be made in order to obtain the final tax total. First, there is a d e d u c t io n  
for ownership of stock in Ohio subsidiaries. These companies are not identified sep­
arately in the annual statement, as only the total ownership interest in affiliates is  r e ­
ported. Thus, it was assumed after trial and error that '/2  of the affiliate in v e s tm e n t s  
were in Ohio companies.
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F o r e i g n  C o m p a n y  S i m u l a t i o n
The simulation of foreign company tax returns was derived from the tax returns 
for both the life and health and property-liability industries. All the necessary data 
were contained on the NAIC statements.
F i r e  M a r s h a l l  T a x
All necessary data were available on the NAIC tapes. Tax bills were then esti­
mated using the tax returns.
R e t a l i a t o r y  T a x
This is a much more difficult tax to estimate, as it requires using the rates and tax 
base of every state with a lower tax bill. We assumed, to make the project treatable, 
that each states rate was that reported in Tables A-l to A-4, and that the tax base in 
each state was premiums written net of policyholder dividends. This seems to be a 
very representative tax base, as most states allow for the deduction of policyholder 
dividends.
The retaliatory tax calculation also includes assessments for insolvency funds and 
license fees. These were assumed to be fixed and not to change according to changes 
in rates. This is not necessarily a poor assumption, as the license fees are relatively 
low and insolvency assessments change every year anyway, depending on the number 
and size of companies. Recent insolvencies have been relatively small, and do not 
add or detract from the simulation’s general results.
ENDNO TES
1. Data regarding the number of companies in each industry were obtained from the 
ACLI’s Life Insurance Factbook for years 1964 to the present and from the Ill’s 
Property Casualty Factbook for years 1964 to 1994.
2. Not all of the 200 or so Ohio companies are true home offices. There are a num­
ber of companies that write a very small amount of business and thus do not con­
tribute dramatically to employment opportunities in Ohio. In addition, there are 
shell companies that may not write any business at all in a given year, but when the 
parent company deems it necessary, may write business as needed. In addition, there 
is another set of companies that may operate as captives of a traditional corporation. 
These captive insurers may write insurance predominantly for the parent company.
3. These companies are Blue Cross-Blue Shield Mutual of Ohio, Central Benefits 
Mutual Insurance Company, and Community Mutual Insurance company. Central 
Benefits Mutual is no longer associated with the Blue Cross organization. Data are 
from Ohio Department of Insurance, Annual Report (1992).
4. Ohio Department of Insurance, Annual Report (1992).
5. Open enrollment means that enrollment in an HMO is open to any consumer, 
whether as part of a group or as an individual.
6- Community rating is the practice of rating for determination of premiums a group 
based on the characteristics of a “community” rather than on the characteristics of 
an individual.
See H.D. Skipper, (1987).
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8. Ohio. Rev. Stats. §§5725.18-.26
9. Ohio. Rev. Stats. §§5729.02
10. Ohio. Rev. Stats. §§5729.04. This is more likely relevant for mutuals as stock com­
panies generally do not have participatory policies.
11. This is not necessarily a bad policy, as a health insurance company would not 
need as much surplus as one that specialized in riskier and longer lines of business.
12. A number of states exempt the Blues, while others provide lower rates to health 
insurers. Further, studies have shown that states with preferences for the Blues have 
higher Blue market shares (see, e.g., Freeh and Ginsberg (1978)) whether more peo­
ple are insured because of this preference has not been shown.
13. In addition to some state tax breaks health insurance enjoys a benevolent federal 
tax policy. For employer sponsored health plans, the employer can deduct the entire 
cost of the health plan from taxable income. Small business too can take advantage 
of this deduction. On the individual basis, there is also a deduction if health expenses 
including insurance are greater than 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income. As there 
are a number of federal tax preferences for health insurance consumption, a state 
should as part of its health care policy decide whether the additional benefits of cov­
erage are worth the fiscal costs of differential treatment.
14. There is an important cost to society from trading off open enrollment and com­
munity underwriting for a tax break. This cost is one that is generally not discussed 
outside of the insurance industry; it is the cost of adverse selection. High-risk indi­
viduals (i.e., those having a higher than average probability of being sick in the next 
year) can and will enroll (assuming they can otherwise pay for the coverage) in an 
HMO, since the community rate is based on average characteristics of the commu­
nity. By allowing unlimited entry of high risk insured and charging them a price not 
reflecting their actual risk, the HMO’s losses increase. These losses are then (at 
least) partially spread to the other members of the HMO. For insured who are on 
the margin whether to purchase health insurance through an HMO or to go without 
insurance, the open enrollment and community rating make the HMO coverage 
more expensive and may cause individuals to go without coverage.
15. The states are AL, CA, DC, FL, ID, KS, ME, MS, NV, NC, SD, WV, and WY.
16. The states are ID, KS, ME, NV, NC, ND, and WY.
17. This number assumes all annuities are subject to the premium tax.
18. This determination of percentage of fire coverage was done by the Insurance 
Services Office.
19. For a description of the state’s authority over insurance companies see Kenneth 
Meyer, “The Political Economy of Insurance Regulation,” (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1987).
20. The number of states that have blatantly discriminated between foreign and do­
mestic companies has diminished since Metropolitan Life v. Ward, 470 United States 
869 (1985) where the Supreme Court stated that it was permissible to discriminate 
between foreign and domestic insurers under the equal protection clause of the 
XlVth Amendment only if the state had a rational basis for doing so. Some states, 
like Ohio and Georgia, still provide some domestics with a tax advantage. This will 
be discussed further below.
21. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 470 United States 869 (1985).
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22. Massachusetts recognized this fact and decided to tax its domestic industry at a 
higher rate that the foreign companies so the domestic industry would not have to 
pay increased retaliatory taxes to other jurisdictions.
23. This could lead to a bizarre result if the right fact pattern exists. For example, 
suppose there is a Kansas company (with a majority of its writings in Ohio) that fails. 
Kansas’ premium tax rate is less than Ohio’s; thus a retaliatory tax must be paid to 
Kansas by Ohio companies writing in Kansas. The tax paid by Ohio companies is in­
creased because of the failure of a Kansas company. Thus, the Kansan treasury ben­
efits from the insolvency of a Kansas firm due to the retaliatory tax paid by foreign 
companies
24.0.R.C. §3956.20.
25. These informational returns are used to monitor the firm’s solvency and contains 
information concerning premiums, losses, and expenses for the company.
26. See Martin Grace and Julie Hotchkiss, (1994), and Stewart, (1984).
27. The states with statutory rates higher than Ohio are AL, AK, HI, MT, and NV 
for life insurance and AL, AK, HI, KY, NY, TX, and WV for property-liability in­
surance. Note that with the exception of Texas, the state markets are relatively small. 
Thus, Ohio is among the largest markets with a high tax rate.
28. The national effective rate is the sum of all premium taxes collected as a per­
centage of total direct premiums written. Ohio’s effective rate is similarly calculated. 
Data employed in these calculations and in Table 12-4 are from ACIR (1993). Note 
that retaliatory taxes paid to other states are not included.
29. H. D. Skipper, (1987).
30. Ibid.
31. If these small companies engage in reinsurance to spread the risk, they are still 
inefficient if a larger company would not have to engage in similar activities.
32. Price Waterhouse and Levin and Driscoll, (1994).
